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INTRODUCTION
The same month Caitlyn Jenner debuted herself to the world on the cover
of Vanity Fair magazine, the Guardian published a profile about Michelle-Lael
Norsworthy and her years-long struggle to get treatment for gender dysphoria
while in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabili* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2021, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Thank you to Whitney Jones, Notes Editor, for her early guidance on the direction of this Note. Thank you to Erika Smolyar, Articles Editor, for her diligent work on
improving my writing. To my faculty supervisor Professor Eve Hanan, whose thoughtful
insight illuminated aspects of this topic I would have otherwise overlooked. To the staff of
the Nevada Law Journal for its efforts in bringing this Note to publication. And finally,
thank you to my wife, Caitlyn, my son, Ryan, and my daughter, Rose. I am perpetually humbled by your boundless patience.
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tations.1 There are thousands of transgender persons incarcerated in America.2
For most, incarceration comes with taunts, threats, sexual violence, and isolation.3 For many, this experience is compounded, as it was in Ms. Norsworthy’s
case, by a refusal from correctional departments to provide adequate treatment
for gender dysphoria.4 In many of these cases, the only recourse is civil litigation, where the individual must rely on a court to enforce the constitutional
right to adequate medical treatment.5
The American Psychiatric Association defines gender dysphoria as “a
marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender.”6 The condition is “associated with clinically significant distress
or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.”7
The World Professional Association for Transgender Health (“WPATH”) provides standards of care for the treatment of individuals diagnosed with gender
dysphoria.8 The WPATH Standards of Care outline best practices related to,
1

Ed Pilkington, ‘Prison Within Prison’: A Transgender Inmate’s Years-Long Battle for
Treatment, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2015, 7:09 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/201
5/jul/26/transgender-woman-inmate-prison-michelle-norsworthy [perma.cc/NPV8-T2E2].
2
The Justice Department’s latest estimate comes from 2014 and was 3,209. BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT., SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2011–12:
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri1112_st.pdf [per
ma.cc/JFS2-9M98]. This Note uses the American Psychological Association’s definition of
transgender: “[a]n umbrella term encompassing those whose gender identities or gender
roles differ from those typically associated with the sex they were assigned at birth.” A Glossary: Defining Transgender Terms, MONITOR ON PSYCH., Sept. 2018, at 32, https://www.apa.
org/monitor/2018/09/ce-corner-glossary [perma.cc/2RTH-9FG4]. Despite a history of stigma, to be transgender is not a mental health disorder or a medical condition. See Suyin
Haynes, The World Health Organization Will Stop Classifying Transgender People as Having a ‘Mental Disorder,’ TIME (May 28, 2019, 12:25 PM), https://time.com/5596845/worldhealth-organization-transgender-identity/ [perma.cc/24Y9-LXCM]. Many transgender people, however, suffer from gender dysphoria, a medical diagnosis for persons who experience
serious emotional distress caused by the difference between the gender assigned to them at
birth and the gender they know themselves to be. Frequently Asked Questions About
Transgender People, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. (July 9, 2016),
https://transequality.org/issues/resources/frequently-asked-questions-about-transgender-peop
le [perma.cc/2LF6-3C62]. The plaintiffs involved in the cases discussed in this Note suffer
from gender dysphoria and requested treatment associated with that medical diagnosis.
3
See, e.g., Editorial Board, Prisons and Jails Put Transgender Inmates at Risk, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/opinion/prisons-and-jails-put-transgen
der-inmates-at-risk.html [perma.cc/T5ZW-QYX6] (describing the experience many
transgender people have while incarcerated).
4
See, e.g., Pilkington, supra note 1.
5
See discussion infra Part II.
6
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
452 (5th ed. 2013).
7
Id. at 453.
8
See generally ELI COLEMAN ET AL., WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH,
STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER
NONCONFORMING PEOPLE (2012), https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/SOC%20v7
/Standards%20of%20Care_V7%20Full%20Book_English.pdf [perma.cc/J6MR-W6WR]
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among others, mental health, hormone therapy, and sex reassignment surgery
(“SRS”).9 The Standards of Care are based on “the best available science and
expert professional consensus” and are widely accepted as the guidelines for
treatment of individuals with gender dysphoria.10
During the past three decades, incarcerated individuals suffering from gender dysphoria have filed lawsuits seeking court orders requiring correctional
departments to provide the individuals with SRS.11 These suits are generally
brought as deliberate medical indifference claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.12 Three circuit courts of appeals have addressed these claims. Despite reaching opposite results for the respective plaintiffs involved, the First
and Ninth Circuits both held that each case required an individualized inquiry
into the specific facts of the plaintiffs’ cases.13 These decisions closely follow
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as it relates to deliberate medical indifference claims.14 In an unusual decision, however, the Fifth Circuit held that prisons could impose blanket bans on SRS entirely.15 This Note discusses the Gibson v. Collier decision in the context of other Eighth Amendment cases and
brings attention to the potential questions the decision might raise for the Fifth
Circuit moving forward.
Part I of this Note outlines policies related to the housing and treatment of
transgender persons as they differ by correctional department. Part II briefly
summarizes the history of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and traces the development of the deliberate medical indifference claim. Part III summarizes the
three circuit court opinions addressing SRS for incarcerated individuals. Finally, Part IV analyzes Gibson against Eighth Amendment precedent and calls attention to questions raised by this unusual decision.

[hereinafter WPATH].
9
Id. at 1. Many transgender people prefer the term “gender confirmation surgery” because
“[a]s many trans folks have noted, surgery doesn’t change one’s gender—it changes the
body in which one experiences that gender.” KC Clements, What to Expect from Gender
Confirmation Surgery, HEALTHLINE (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.healthline.com/health/tran
sgender/gender-confirmation-surgery [perma.cc/9KEL-RJMS]. This Note uses “sex reassignment surgery” because that is the term used in both the current WPATH standards of
care and in each case discussed in this Note.
10
WPATH, supra note 8, at 1; see infra Section IV.B.
11
See discussion infra Part III. This Note focuses only on cases in which the plaintiff seeks
SRS and does not include cases where the plaintiff disputes the adequacy of mental health or
hormonal treatments.
12
See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also discussion infra Part II.
13
Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 794 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Edmo II”); see Kosilek v.
Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 90–91 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Kosilek IV”).
14
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
15
Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 215–16 (5th Cir. 2019).
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PRISON POLICIES RELATING TO TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS

Prison policies relating to the treatment of persons with gender dysphoria
vary widely. Some correctional departments provide detailed guidelines covering diagnosis, housing, property, and medical treatment, including the opportunity to be reviewed for SRS eligibility.16 Others provide guidelines for intake,
housing, and treatment in the form of counseling or hormone therapy but remain silent as to whether SRS might be an option.17 Finally, some correctional
departments provide a general plan for compliance with the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”), with no specific treatment guidelines for persons with
gender dysphoria.18 While some states have undertaken to address the
healthcare issues faced by transgender individuals behind bars, in a majority of
states, the adequacy of the treatment these individuals receive creates concern.19
In 2017, Prison Policy Initiative undertook an evaluation of twenty-one
states’ policies as related to PREA and the WPATH Standards of Care.20 The
evaluation included findings that 81 percent of state policies failed to provide
for psychotherapy, let alone pharmaceutical therapy or SRS for incarcerated
persons with gender dysphoria.21 The findings further showed that 37 percent of
transgender individuals who were receiving hormone therapy prior to incarceration were denied hormones once inside, resulting in exposure to serious
medical consequences.22 Prison Policy Initiative ultimately concluded that
“[a]ll but one [state came] up short” in treating transgender individuals.23

16

See, e.g., CAL. CORR. HEALTH CARE SERVS., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. AND REHAB.,
CCHCS/DHCS CARE GUIDE: TRANSGENDER (2020), https://cchcs.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads
/sites/60/CG/Transgender-CG.pdf [perma.cc/RQ2H-B3JZ]; CAL. CORR. HEALTH CARE
SERVS., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. AND REHAB., GUIDELINES FOR REVIEW OF REQUESTS FOR
GENDER AFFIRMING SURGERY 5 (2018), https://cchcs.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/60/CG
/Guidelines-ReviewRequestsGender-Affirming-Surgery.pdf [perma.cc/XVG3-QPLY].
17
See, e.g., COLO. DEP’T OF CORR., OFFENDER HEALTH SERVICES: PRACTICES CONCERNING
TRANSGENDER OFFENDERS, REG. NO. 700–14 (2019), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ULY1
8Ojom9C4S9OKxEAKahBL0ZuAql7J/view [perma.cc/6KX2-9GQ6].
18
See, e.g., CORR. INST. DIV., TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST., SAFE PRISONS/PREA PLAN (2019),
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/documents/cid/Safe_Prisons_PREA_Plan.pdf [perma.cc/V8AKAVWP].
19
See Elliot Oberholtzer, The Dismal State of Transgender Incarceration Policies, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/11/08/transgender
/ [perma.cc/9CFJ-HY57].
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. Oberholtzer spotlights Delaware as having the “best policy for the treatment of
transgender people in prison.” Id. Even still, Delaware’s “excellent policy” does not expressly provide for mastectomies, indicating, according to Oberholtzer, “an additional barrier to
care for trans men: the faulty assumption, almost universal in these policies, that the only
transgender individuals who end up incarcerated are trans women.” Id. Oberholtzer’s article
was written prior to California’s new policy being implemented. See infra notes 39–52 and
accompanying text.
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Every state except Utah has agreed to comply with PREA,24 and most have
outlined a general compliance plan that at least touches on the classification
and housing of transgender individuals.25 The Texas Department of Criminal
Justice’s “Safe Prisons/PREA Plan,” for example, provides guidelines for determining where a transgender individual will be housed on a case-by-case basis.26 The guidelines balance security concerns against the health and safety of
the individual, including giving “serious consideration” to the individual’s
views with respect to the individual’s own safety.27 The guidelines further permit transgender persons to shower separately from other incarcerated persons
and require staff to be trained in the methods of conducting pat-down searches
in the “least intrusive manner possible.”28 While the department’s guidelines
dictate that all individuals identified as transgender be referred to medical
staff,29 they are silent as to the manner or scope of treatment an individual may
receive.
Other states outline methods for treating transgender individuals but are silent as to whether SRS would be an option.30 For example, the Colorado Department of Corrections’ “Practices Concerning Transgender Offenders” Administrative Regulation provides procedures for the intake, housing, and
medical treatment specific to incarcerated persons with gender dysphoria.31 The
procedures allow for the continuation (or commencement) of hormone therapy,
along with access to psychiatric and mental health services, including individual and group support therapy.32 The procedures are silent as to SRS, but do provide for a “Gender Dysphoria and Treatment Committee,” which proposes individualized treatment plans for transgender individuals.33 The procedures
specifically note that treatment plans may include but are not limited to “real
life experiences consistent with the prison environment, hormone therapy, and
counseling.”34 As such, the procedures may be read to imply that SRS could be

24

Utah has rejected to implement PREA’s standards since the bill’s passage in 2003, choosing instead to forfeit approximately $140,000 in federal grant money each year. See Luke
Ramseth, Utah One of Only Two States Not Complying with Federal Prison-Rape Guidelines, DOJ Says, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 15, 2017, 10:45 AM), https://archive.sltrib.com/arti
cle.php?id=5284203&itype=CMSID [perma.cc/K5Q6-CYEK]. That article mentions Arkansas as well; however, the state appears to have now implemented PREA. See ARK. DEP’T OF
CORR., PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT (PREA), ADMIN. DIRECTIVE NO. 15–29 (2017),
https://adc.arkansas.gov/images/uploads/AD_2015-29_PREA.pdf [perma.cc/9UMU-AC5D].
25
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
26
CORR. INST. DIV., TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST., supra note 18, at 19.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 9, 34.
29
Id. at 16.
30
See COLO. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 17.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 5.
33
Id. at 1.
34
Id. at 5.
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granted in certain cases; however, there is no evidence that the department has
ever granted SRS or denied it.35
Delaware, California, and Oklahoma lay out explicit policies and guidelines for SRS, should the treatment be medically necessary for a transgender
individual behind bars.36 Delaware’s Department of Correction policy provides
for SRS to be “considered on a case-by-case basis as a component of the individualized treatment plan.”37 Oklahoma’s Department of Corrections policy allows for SRS only in “extraordinary circumstances.”38 The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations (“CDCR”) has the most permissive
guidelines for the treatment of transgender individuals, permitting any request
for SRS to be considered by three separate committees, provided the individual
meets basic prerequisite criteria.39 All requests are ultimately reviewed by an
SRS Review Committee comprised of two physicians from CDCR’s Medical
Services, two physicians from CDCR’s Mental Health Program, and two psychologists from CDCR’s Mental Health Program.40 The Committee considers a
number of factors, including the continuously manifested desire to live as one’s
preferred sex, the individual’s distress due to gender dysphoria,41 and whether
the individual can be expected to adjust to confinement postoperatively.42 The

35

The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ guidelines similarly mention “hormone or other necessary
medical treatment,” while remaining silent as to SRS specifically. See FED. BUREAU OF
PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., TRANSGENDER OFFENDER MANUAL 9 (rev. 2018), https://www.
bop.gov/policy/progstat/5200-04-cn-1.pdf [perma.cc/B2KE-H6WT].
36
See DEL. DEP’T OF CORR., POLICY E-14 TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER PERSONS 4 (2020),
https://doc.delaware.gov/assets/documents/policies/policy_11-E-14.pdf
[perma.cc/R3X9S4NV]; CAL. CORR. HEALTH CARE SERVS., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. AND REHAB., GUIDELINES
FOR REVIEW OF REQUESTS FOR GENDER AFFIRMING SURGERY, supra note 16; OKLA. DEP’T. OF
CORR., OP-140147 DETERMINATION AND MANAGEMENT OF INMATES WITH GENDER
DYSPHORIA (2020), http://doc.publishpath.com/Websites/doc/images/Documents/Policy/op1
40147.pdf [perma.cc/97UW-EQTR]. While the Massachusetts Department of Correction’s
guidelines for treating transgender individuals do not expressly mention SRS, they do provide for an individualized treatment plan that must comply with “the most current version”
of the WPATH Standards of Care, implying that SRS would fall within the possible scope of
treatment. See MASS. DEP’T. OF CORR., IDENTIFICATION, TREATMENT AND CORRECTIONAL
MANAGEMENT OF INMATES DIAGNOSED WITH GENDER DYSPHORIA 9 (2017), https://www.mas
s.gov/files/documents/2016/09/qz/652.pdf [perma.cc/H66P-6DSP].
37
DEL. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 36, at 4.
38
OKLA. DEP’T. OF CORR., supra note 36, at 5. The policy further specifies that selfcastration does not constitute “surgical reassignment therapy and will not qualify an” individual to be housed “in a facility for [persons] of the opposite sex from the inmate’s birth
sex.” Id.
39
CAL. CORR. HEALTH CARE SERVS., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. AND REHAB., GUIDELINES FOR
REVIEW OF REQUESTS FOR GENDER AFFIRMING SURGERY, supra note 16, at 1–4.
40
See id. at 2.
41
This does not include any distress caused by confinement or other mental illness. Id. at 3.
42
Id.
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Committee’s recommendation is then sent to a final committee,43 which can
grant the SRS request, with or without conditions, or deny it.44
California also recently changed its general policy relating to incarcerated
persons with gender dysphoria. In May 2019, the state’s Senate passed Senate
Bill 132 by twenty-nine votes to eight.45 The Bill addresses the “exceptionally
high rates of sexual victimization” faced by incarcerated transgender individuals by outlining classification and housing guidelines for these individuals.46
Per the Bill, upon initial intake, the CDCR will ask each individual about gender identity, sex assigned at birth, and preferred first name, gender pronoun,
and honorific.47 CDCR staff are required to use the individual’s preferred gender pronoun and honorific, and an individual may change that preference at any
time.48
A more controversial aspect of the Bill deals with housing determinations
for transgender incarcerated persons. Per the Bill, the CDCR is required to
house the individual in “a correctional facility designated for men or women
based on the individual’s preference . . . .”49 Because the Bill does not require a
diagnosis of gender dysphoria or any other physical or mental health diagnosis,
regardless of anatomy to apply,50 conservative groups and anti-transgender
feminist groups alike have raised concerns over the threat that a transgender
female might pose if housed at a female prison.51 Still, the Bill does provide for
the housing of an individual in a manner contrary to the person’s perception of
health and safety, so long as the CDCR outlines its “management or security
concerns” related to the individual’s housing assignment in writing.52 Prison
policies relating to housing, property, and medical treatment have a profound
impact on a transgender person’s time while incarcerated. Where prison policies do not provide transgender individuals with adequate medical treatment for

43

The recommendation is sent to the Statewide Medical Authorization Review Team. Id. at

1.
44

Id. at 4.
S.B. 132, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
46
Id.
47
Id. at 3. The Bill defines “honorific” as “a form of respectful address typically combined
with an individual’s surname.” Id
48
Id.
49
Id. at 4.
50
Id. at 3–4.
51
See, e.g., Madeleine Kearns, California’s Transgender Prison Policy Is a Disaster for
Women, NAT’L. REV. (June 26, 2019, 4:41 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/06/ca
lifornias-transgender-prison-policy-is-a-disaster-for-women/ [perma.cc/25UV-NP3G]. At the
California assembly hearing on the Bill, Abigail Lunetta, a “Democrat, feminist,
and . . . advocate for women’s rights,” raised concerns about the Bill’s implications stating,
“[r]ight now, Richard Masbruch, a trans-identified male, is currently housed with female inmates in Corona, even though he is serving time for targeting, raping, and torturing women.
Under no circumstances is this morally justifiable.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
52
S.B. 132 at 4.
45
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gender dysphoria, the individual generally must sue for relief under the Eighth
Amendment’s proscription on cruel and unusual punishment.
II. DELIBERATE MEDICAL INDIFFERENCE AS “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT”
The history of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments has been summarized at length by courts and scholars alike.53
Nevertheless, briefly tracing the history of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
allows us to arrive at the current legal standard for a claim of deliberate medical
indifference. In its earliest cases, the Supreme Court discussed “cruel” and
“unusual” separately but focused its holdings on the punishment’s degree of
cruelty.54 Decades later in 1958, however, the Court announced a new Eighth
Amendment analysis.55 In Trop v. Dulles, the Court noted that the words of the
Eighth Amendment “are not precise,” and that its “scope is not static.”56 Instead, the Eighth Amendment must “draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”57
Since Trop, this “standards of decency” rule has been used by the Supreme
Court on different occasions to invalidate the use of the death penalty against
juveniles,58 the mentally disabled,59 and child rapists.60 Even earlier, the rule
was used to establish the Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate medical indifference against incarcerated persons.61 In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court heard a
claim by J.W. Gamble, an individual incarcerated in the Texas Department of
Corrections who injured his back while unloading cotton from a truck as a pris-

53

See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169–73 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 316–28 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment
Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments That Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 567, 573–80 (2010). See generally Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969).
54
Ryan, supra note 53, at 582–83.
55
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958).
56
Id.
57
Id. at 101.
58
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (“The conclusion that it would offend
civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time
of his or her offense is consistent with the views that have been expressed by respected professional organizations, by other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the
leading members of the Western European community.”).
59
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“Construing and applying the Eighth
Amendment in the light of our ‘evolving standards of decency,’ we therefore conclude that
such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on
the State's power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” (citation omitted)).
60
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446–47 (2008) (“The rule of evolving standards of
decency with specific marks on the way to full progress and mature judgment means that
resort to the [death] penalty must be reserved for the worst of crimes and limited in its instances of application.”).
61
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976).
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on work assignment.62 Despite the fact that prison medical personnel had seen
Gamble seventeen times during a three-month period following the incident,
Gamble alleged that the staff could have done more for his back injury “by way
of diagnosis and treatment.”63 While explaining that mere negligent medical
treatment would not violate the Eighth Amendment,64 the Court held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” violates the Eighth
Amendment’s proscription against “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”
and offends society’s “evolving standards of decency.”65
The Supreme Court explained the deliberate indifference test in Farmer v.
Brennan.66 There, a transgender individual, Dee Farmer, sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons after she was transferred to a high-security prison where she
was beaten and raped by another incarcerated person.67 The Court rejected
Farmer’s invitation to adopt an entirely objective deliberate indifference test.68
Instead, the Court required subjective proof that a prison official “both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists, and [that] he must also draw the inference.”69
Several circuit courts of appeals have applied this “Farmer framework” to
deliberate medical indifference claims of incarcerated persons with a range of
health conditions, including pregnancy,70 HIV,71 diabetes,72 hepatitis C,73 and
cataracts.74 A claim of deliberate medical indifference is also the vehicle by
which an individual with gender dysphoria can challenge the adequacy of the
medical treatment provided by the prison.75 To prevail on a claim of deliberate
medical indifference under Farmer, plaintiffs must satisfy a test comprising
one objective prong and one subjective prong.76 The plaintiff must first demon62

Id. at 98–99.
Id. at 107. Gamble argued, and the Fifth Circuit agreed, that the medical staff ought to
have ordered an x-ray to better diagnose the injury. Id. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected this argument. Id.
64
Id. at 105–106 (“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely
because the victim is a prisoner.”).
65
Id. at 104, 106.
66
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
67
Id. at 829–30.
68
Id. at 837.
69
Id.
70
Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 329 (3d Cir. 1987).
71
Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. 1991).
72
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 193 (3d Cir. 1999).
73
Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 2011).
74
Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2014).
75
See discussion infra Part III.
76
See, e.g., Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The test for constitutional
liability of prison officials ‘involves both an objective and a subjective component.’ ” (citation omitted)); Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (“To show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy
both an objective and a subjective inquiry.” (citations omitted)); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37
63
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strate the existence, objectively, of a serious medical need.77 The plaintiff must
then prove that a prison official both knew of and disregarded a serious risk to
the individual’s health or safety.78 For individuals incarcerated in state facilities, deliberate medical indifference claims are generally brought under § 1983
of the U.S. Code, which enables the plaintiff to sue for damages or for an injunction.79
III. THE SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY CASES
The First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have addressed whether prisons are required to provide incarcerated persons with SRS to adequately treat gender
dysphoria under the Eighth Amendment.80 The First and Ninth Circuit concluded that departments of correction are required to provide transgender persons
with an individualized assessment for whether SRS is appropriate in each
case.81 The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, held that a blanket ban on SRS for
incarcerated persons would not run afoul the Eighth Amendment.82 This Part
summarizes each case in turn.
F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The deliberate indifference standard embodies both an objective
and a subjective prong.”).
77
Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In the
deliberate medical indifference context, circuit courts of appeals agree that a “serious” medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one that
is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” See, e.g., Leite v. Bergeron, 911 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2018); Richmond v. Huq, 885
F.3d 928, 938 (6th Cir. 2018); Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210
(4th Cir. 2017); Kuhne v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 745 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2014); King v.
Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012); Martinez v. Garden, 430 F.3d 1302, 1304
(10th Cir. 2005). The Third Circuit uses the same test nearly word-for-word, only substituting “requiring” for “mandating.” See, e.g., Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314,
320 (3d Cir. 2005).
78
Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066 (citation omitted); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837 (1994).
79
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”). In each of the cases discussed below, the plaintiff
sued for an injunction requiring a correctional department to provide the person with SRS.
This Note does not discuss each court’s preliminary injunction analysis but addresses only
the merits of each person’s Eighth Amendment claim.
80
The Seventh Circuit addressed this issue in Campbell v. Kallas; however, that decision
was a review of the district court’s denying of the defendants’ claim of qualified immunity.
Campbell v. Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 2019). The court concluded that there was
not enough case law to establish a constitutional right to treatment of gender dysphoria beyond hormone therapy. Id. at 549. While the court did note that it was “doubtful” whether
the plaintiff could prove deliberate medical indifference, id. at 538, its analysis did not reach
the merits of her claim.
81
Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 794 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Edmo II”); Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 91 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Kosilek IV”).
82
Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 216 (2019).
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A. Kosilek v. Spencer
In the First Circuit, an incarcerated individual with gender dysphoria,
Michelle Kosilek, had been denied SRS by the Massachusetts Department of
Correction (“MDOC”) due to security concerns and disagreements over whether the procedure was medically necessary.83 Kosilek, who was eventually convicted of strangling her then-wife before leaving the body in the backseat of a
vehicle at a shopping mall, had made an attempt at self-castration and two attempts at suicide while awaiting her trial.84 By the time Kosilek reached the
First Circuit’s en banc review, the “litigation [had] spanned more than twenty
years and [had] produced several opinions of significant length.”85
In a sixty-plus page opinion that followed a twenty-eight-day trial, the district court applied the WPATH Standards of Care and noted that SRS was
“widely recognized” as medically necessary for the treatment of gender dysphoria. 86 In conducting its Eighth Amendment analysis, the court found that
Kosilek’s gender dysphoria was indeed a serious medical need.87 Then, while
explaining that an incarcerated individual is not entitled to “ideal care or the
care of his [or her] choice,” the court found that SRS was the only adequate
treatment for Kosilek’s gender dysphoria, crediting the testimony of her expert
witnesses.88

83

Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 74–81.
Id. at 68–69. The murder of Kosilek’s wife was precipitated by an argument over Kosilek
wearing her wife’s clothing. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 213 (D. Mass.
2012) (“Kosilek II”).
85
Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 68. Kosilek’s odyssey in the federal courts commenced in 1992
with a lawsuit that spanned ten years. Kosilek v. Maloney 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass.
2002) (“Kosilek I”). While not discussed herein, this Note takes the First Circuit’s lead in
designating Kosilek v. Maloney as “Kosilek I.” See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 68. Thus, at the
risk of confusing the reader, the first case discussed in depth in this Note (the District
Court’s Kosilek v. Spencer decision) is designated herein as “Kosilek II.” The First Circuit’s
first review of that decision is designated “Kosilek III.” And the First Circuit’s en banc opinion is designated “Kosilek IV.”
86
Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (2012). The “Harry Benjamin Standards of Care” that
the court cites were the precursors to the WPATH Standards of Care. See WPATH, supra
note 8, at 107. The United States Tax Court had recently held that hormonal treatments and
SRS could be tax deductible for certain individuals as forms of necessary medical care, and
the Seventh Circuit had recently struck down a Wisconsin state statute prohibiting hormonal
treatments and SRS for incarcerated persons as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 77 (2010); Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th
Cir. 2011).
87
Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 229–30.
88
Id. at 199, 225–27. The court repudiated the defendant’s expert witness and deemed him
“not a prudent professional for several reasons.” Id. at 235. Among the court’s reasons were
Dr. Schmidt’s rejection of “certain fundamental features” of the Standards of Care, his belief
that SRS is never medically necessary, and his belief that an incarcerated person cannot have
a “real life experience” as required by the Standards of Care. Id.
84
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Next, the court found that MDOC Commissioner Kathleen Dennehy actually knew that Kosilek had a serious medical need.89 It deemed MDOC’s contention that Kosilek was denied SRS because of security concerns as pretextual
and found Dennehy’s conduct to be wanton, in violation of the Eight Amendment.90 In making this determination, the court pointed to Dennehy’s participation in firing an MDOC doctor who had recommended SRS for Kosilek and her
immediately halting the treatment of transgender persons upon becoming Acting Commissioner of MDOC (purportedly to review each individual case).91
The court also found that she had offered false testimony, claiming to have
misunderstood that MDOC’s medical consultants were recommending SRS for
Kosilek. 92 Throughout the opinion, the court offered scathing criticism of
Dennehy, asserting that she was “determined not to be the first prison official in
the United States to authorize [SRS] for an inmate,” and that she opposed
Kosilek’s SRS only out of fear of facing political backlash from the media.93
The court took particular offense to the fact that Dennehy had testified under
oath that she would “retire rather than obey an order from the Supreme Court”
to provide SRS for an individual incarcerated by MDOC.94
The First Circuit’s first review of Kosilek II was released approximately
eighteen months after the district court’s order.95 After “setting forth the extensive backdrop of Kosilek’s odyssey,”96 the court held that the trial judge had
neither erred in finding that Kosilek suffered from a serious medical need that
89

Id. at 238.
Id. at 238–47.
91
Id. at 240.
92
Id. (“The court finds that Dennehy was pretending not to understand UMass’s treatment
recommendations in order to delay having to announce that she would not allow Kosilek to
receive [SRS].”).
93
Id. at 203, 220. The Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor had publicly opposed using tax
revenues to provide incarcerated persons with SRS, id. at 225, and the Boston Globe had
published a series of incendiary articles opposing Kosilek’s petition. See e.g., Brian
McGrory, A Test Case for a Change, BOS. GLOBE (June 13, 2000), https://www.bostonglobe.
com/metro/2000/06/13/test-case-for-change/s9jYsy33HXfJ3ajRNZYpMO/story.html [perma
.cc/HK92-P22R] (“Now in prison . . . [Kosilek] says he pines every moment of every day to
be the woman he was always meant to be. And he’s demanding that the state, meaning you
and me, pay the $25,000 for a sex-change operation, which the more politically correct call a
‘sexual reassignment.’ ”); Eileen McNamara, When Gender Isn’t Relevant, BOS. GLOBE
(June 11, 2006), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/06/11/when_gender_isnt
_relevant/ [perma.cc/N8GZ-E3MG] (“The [Kosilek] trial underway in federal court in Boston is not about the rights of transsexuals. It’s about the manipulations of a murderer.”);
Globe Editorial, Set Limits on Sex Change, BOS. GLOBE (June 15, 2006), http://archive.bosto
n.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2006/06/15/set_limits_on_sex_change
/ [perma.cc/5JYF-LFVJ] (“Kosilek’s case is not compelling for reasons even beyond the obvious distastefulness of a wife killer angling to serve out his sentence of life without parole
in a women’s prison.”).
94
Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 201, 220, 228.
95
Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Kosilek III”).
96
Id. at 758. The court wrote an approximately twenty-two-page summary of the litigation.
90
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could only be adequately treated by SRS, nor in finding that MDOC’s security
rationale for denying Kosilek the surgery was “largely false and greatly exaggerated.”97 While acknowledging that Kosilek’s procedure may “strike[] some
as odd or unorthodox,” the First Circuit was ultimately unwilling to overturn
the trial judge, who the court determined was “well-placed” to make the findings that he did.98 In a dissent that foreshadowed the ultimate reversal of the
district court’s decision, Judge Torruella argued that the majority based its
opinion on “several erroneous assumptions” and reached a result “beyond the
limits of [the court’s] established Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”99
Judge Torruella also wrote the majority opinion for the First Circuit’s reversal—and ultimate dismissal—of Kosilek’s case en banc.100 In first analyzing
the objective prong of Kosilek’s Eighth Amendment claim, the court acknowledged that gender dysphoria is a serious medical need and then focused on the
district court’s finding that MDOC’s treatment of Kosilek’s gender dysphoria
was constitutionally inadequate.101 The court determined that MDOC’s medical
experts’ views were within the range of medical prudence and cited “several
erroneous determinations” made by the district court in finding the contrary. 102
The court further held that MDOC’s treatment plan for Kosilek was not sufficiently harmful so as to violate the Eighth Amendment and admonished the district court for “unduly minimiz[ing] the nature of [MDOC’s] preferred treatment plan.”103 The court found no basis for accepting Kosilek’s contention that
denying her SRS would result in a de facto blanket ban against MDOC providing SRS for incarcerated individuals with gender dysphoria.104 It did, however,
97

Id. at 766, 772.
Id. at 772–73 (“Here the trial judge had the opportunity to preside over two lawsuits involving the same players and similar allegations, to hear evidence in this case over the
course of a twenty-eight day trial, to question witnesses, to assess credibility, to review a
large volume of exhibits, and, in general, to live with this case for twelve years (twenty years
if you count [Kosilek’s initial litigation]). The judge was well-placed to make the factual
findings he made, and there is certainly evidentiary support for those findings.”).
99
Id. at 773 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
100
Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 68.
101
Id. at 85–90.
102
Id. at 87. These erroneous determinations included a misrepresentation of the flexibility
of the WPATH Standards of Care, a mischaracterization of MDOC’s medical experts’ “refusal” to issue letters of recommendation for SRS, and an overstatement regarding consensus
in the medical community as to the “real-life experience” required by the Standards of Care.
Id. at 86–89.
103
Id. at 89. The court took issue with the fact that the district court limited its ruling to find
that “psychotherapy and antidepressants alone would not adequately treat Kosilek’s [gender
dysphoria]” while disregarding the fact that MDOC also provided Kosilek with hormone
therapy, facial hair removal, regular mental health treatment, and feminine clothing and accessories, with (as conceded by Kosilek) much success. Id. at 89–90.
104
Id. at 90–91. The dissent was less concerned about MDOC creating a blanket ban on SRS
and more concerned that the majority’s decision would “preclude inmates from ever being
able to mount a successful Eighth Amendment claim for [SRS] in the courts.” Id. at 106–07
(Thompson, J., dissenting).
98
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warn that such a ban would “conflict with the requirement that medical care be
individualized based on a particular prisoner’s serious medical needs.”105
Proceeding to its analysis of the subjective prong of Kosilek’s claim
(whether MDOC acted with deliberate indifference towards her), the First Circuit clarified that the focus lay not with the district court’s belief about what
was medically necessary, but with the MDOC staff’s knowledge.106 The court
held that, in this case, MDOC had reasonably chosen between two alternative
treatment paths accepted by medical professionals.107 It further pointed out that
even a later court ruling, in which a prison’s administrators erred in their estimation of a treatment’s reasonableness, does not amount to “the sort of obstinacy and disregard” required for a finding of deliberate indifference.108
Finally, the court addressed the MDOC security concerns, which the district court had spurned.109 Once more explaining the importance of whether
MDOC’s security concerns had a “reasoned basis,” rather than the immateriality of the district court’s belief regarding the accuracy of those concerns, the
court found MDOC’s security concerns to be reasonable.110 The court maintained that it took “no great stretch of the imagination” to recognize reasonable
security concerns related to where the department might house a male-tofemale transgender individual who had been convicted of “extreme violence
against a female domestic partner.”111 It also found that MDOC’s concerns,
which involved future individuals using threats of suicide or self-harm as a
means of extracting desired benefits from the department of corrections, constituted a reasonable security concern.112 While the court gave deference to the
district court’s rejection of Commissioner Dennehy as a credible witness, this
was insufficient to affirm the district court’s ruling that MDOC’s security concerns were wholly pretextual—particularly because Dennehy had left her position years prior to the decision to deny Kosilek’s SRS being made.113 Over
twenty years after originally suing for injunctive relief to obtain SRS, Kosilek’s
request was denied.
B. Gibson v. Collier
Four years after Kosilek IV, in Gibson v. Collier,114 the Fifth Circuit held
that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) was not required to
make individualized assessments for each individual requesting SRS and that
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 91 (citation omitted); see discussion infra Section IV.A.
Kosilek IV, 774 F3d at 91.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 92–96.
Id. at 93–94.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 95–96.
Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019).
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failing to provide SRS could not fall within the plain meaning of “cruel and
unusual” punishment.115 Originally incarcerated on two counts of aggravated
robbery, Vanessa Lynn Gibson subsequently committed aggravated assault,
possession of a deadly weapon, and murder in prison.116 She had been diagnosed with gender dysphoria and had lived as a female since the age of fifteen.117 She had attempted self-castration and three times attempted suicide—
although she admits that the suicide attempts were not solely because of her
gender dysphoria.118
After having been repeatedly denied SRS by TDCJ, Gibson brought suit
challenging TDCJ’s policy relating to the treatment of transgender individuals
and seeking an injunction requiring TDCJ to evaluate her for SRS.119 While
whether the policy was merely silent about SRS or proscribed it entirely was
unclear on its face, the court noted that the policy was a “categorical policy
judgment not to wade into the controversial world of [SRS].”120 TDCJ’s Director moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and sovereign
immunity.121 The district court rejected both defenses but nevertheless granted
summary judgment, ruling sua sponte that Gibson’s Eighth Amendment claim
failed on the merits.122 On appeal, despite “procedural defects” at the lower
court, which “might very well” have been reason for remand, Gibson and her
counsel requested that the court remand based solely on the merits.123 The Fifth
Circuit accepted her invitation to reach the merits of her claim.
Proceeding on a “sparse record” that included only the WPATH Standards
of Care, the Fifth Circuit first noted (and indeed, TDCJ acknowledged) that
Gibson’s gender dysphoria was, objectively, a serious medical need.124 The
court also noted, however, that disagreement over medical treatment would not
be enough to state a claim of deliberate medical indifference.125 According to
the court, Gibson “seem[ed] to accept” that fact and had stated in her brief that
to prevail, she must demonstrate “universal acceptance by the medical community” that SRS was required to treat gender dysphoria.126 Ultimately, Gibson’s

115

Id. at 224–28.
Id. at 216–17.
117
Id. at 217. In a footnote, the court explains that the opinion would use male pronouns
when referring to Gibson, citing TDCJ policy and Supreme Court precedent. Id. n.2.
118
Id. at 217.
119
Id. at 217–18.
120
Id. at 218, 224.
121
Id. at 218.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 218–19 (“Reasonable counsel might conclude that it would be a waste of time and
resources for everyone involved (and give false hope to Gibson) to remand for procedural
reasons.”).
124
Id. at 219, 221.
125
Id. at 220.
126
Id.
116

21 NEV. L.J. 405

420

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:1

inability to do so “doom[ed]” her claim.127 Citing the Kosilek IV court’s “exhaustively detailed” summary of the expert testimony presented at trial in that
case, the Gibson court noted that “respected doctors profoundly disagree about
whether [SRS] is medically necessary to [adequately] treat gender dysphoria.”128 Because Gibson would never be able to prove the medical community’s
consensus regarding SRS, the court rejected Gibson’s assertion that she could
present evidence on remand that would demonstrate her individual need for
SRS.129
The Fifth Circuit rejected the dissent’s contention that permitting a blanket
ban on SRS would be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.130 It noted
that Gibson had acknowledged in her brief, and her counsel had conceded at
oral argument, that “if the logic of Kosilek [IV] is correct, it would allow a
‘blanket refusal to provide SRS.’ ”131 The court then proceeded to cite the
Kosilek IV dissent as sister circuit precedent approving this blanket ban on SRS
for incarcerated persons.132 It concluded this analysis by comparing how the
Food and Drug Administration makes categorical judgments about which medical treatments may or may not be made available to American citizens without
an individualized assessment in each case.133
Having concluded that Gibson’s inability to prove medical consensus about
SRS doomed her claim “as a matter of established precedent,” the court proceeded (almost as an aside) to address “an even more fundament flaw” with her
claim.134 Quoting various opinions of Justice Antonin Scalia, a Yale Law Journal article, and Webster’s Dictionary, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits only punishments that are both cruel and unusual.135 If a practice to deny transgender individuals SRS is widely accepted, the
argument went, then TDCJ doing so could not be tantamount to an “unusual”
127

Id. at 221.
Id. at 221–23. The Gibson dissent challenged the majority’s use of the Kosilek record to
reach its conclusion. Id. at 232 (Barksdale, J., dissenting). While the majority conceded “it
might have been better practice” to have had evidence from the TDCJ, it concluded that this
was not grounds for reversal, as there was “no reason why—as a matter of either common
sense or constitutional law—one state cannot rely on the universally shared experiences and
policy determinations of other states.” Id. at 224.
129
Id. at 223–24 (“Because Gibson does not dispute the expert testimony assembled by the
First Circuit concerning the medical debate surrounding [SRS], [s]he cannot establish on remand that such surgery is universally accepted as an effective or necessary treatment for
gender dysphoria. Nor can [s]he contend that TDCJ has been deliberately indifferent to [her]
serious medical needs—particularly where TDCJ continues to treat [her] gender dysphoria
through other means.” (citation omitted)).
130
Id. at 224–25.
131
Id. at 225.
132
Id. Ironically, the Kosilek IV court specifically warned against such an interpretation.
Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 90–91; see discussion infra Section IV.A.
133
Gibson, 920 F.3d at 225.
134
Id. at 226
135
Id. at 226–28.
128
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punishment.136 The court noted that SRS had only been provided to an incarcerated individual once—and then as a part of a settlement agreement137—and
thus concluded that Gibson could not “state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment under the plain text and original meaning of the Eighth Amendment,
regardless of any facts [she] might have presented in the event of remand.”138
C. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc.
In a decision that signaled the direction the Ninth Circuit would take in
cases involving incarcerated persons diagnosed with gender dysphoria, the district court in Norsworthy v. Beard granted a plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
injunction and ordered the CDCR to provide her with SRS.139 The case was initiated by Michelle-Lael Norsworthy shortly after the District of Massachusetts’
Kosilek II decision (later reversed, as discussed above), which required the
Massachusetts Department of Correction to provide SRS to Ms. Kosilek. 140
Norsworthy had been diagnosed with gender dysphoria141 approximately twelve
years prior to filing her complaint and had been denied SRS by CDCR on three
levels of appeal.142
The district court in Norsworthy outlined the WPATH Standards of Care,
which CDCR did not dispute as the accepted standards of care for the treatment
of patients diagnosed with gender dysphoria.143 In analyzing Norsworthy’s deliberate medical indifference claim, the court applied WPATH’s SRS eligibility
criteria to find that Norsworthy was likely to satisfy the “serious medical need”
prong of the Farmer framework,144 while soundly rejecting the opinions of
CDCR’s expert witness.145 The court further found that Norsworthy had provided compelling evidence showing that CDCR acted with deliberate indifference by failing to provide her with SRS, despite having access “to the relevant
Standards of Care and evidence that SRS was medically necessary for Norsworthy.”146 While the Ninth Circuit ultimately dismissed the injunction as
136

Id. at 226–27.
See Quine v. Beard, No. 14-CV-02726, 2017 WL 1540758, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28,
2017).
138
Gibson, 920 F.3d at 228.
139
Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
140
Id. at 1173–74; see also Kosilek IV, 744 F.3d 63.
141
Gender dysphoria was generally known as “gender identity disorder” at the time Norsworthy was diagnosed in January 2000. Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1170.
142
Id. at 1174–76.
143
Id. at 1170–71, 1186.
144
Id. at 1187; see discussion supra Part II.
145
Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1188 (“The Court gives very little weight to the opinions
of Levine, whose report misrepresents the Standards of Care; overwhelmingly relies on generalizations about gender dysphoric prisoners, rather than an individualized assessment of
Norsworthy; contains illogical inferences; and admittedly includes references to a fabricated
anecdote.”).
146
Id. at 1189.
137
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moot,147 the district court’s opinion has been echoed in subsequent cases within
the Circuit.
While the Norsworthy litigation was progressing, Shiloh Quine, a
transgender individual also housed by CDCR, brought an action seeking both
“access to adequate medical care, including [SRS],” and “structural changes
[to] CDCR’s treatment of transgender [individuals].”148 The parties eventually
reached a settlement agreement, the terms of which were shared with the court
during a settlement conference.149 CDCR agreed to (and did) provide Quine
with SRS.150 CDCR further agreed to revise its policies concerning medically
necessary treatment, including surgery for transgender individuals, as well as
its policies concerning the gender-specific items that transgender individuals
would be allowed to possess.151
In complying with the settlement agreement, CDCR revised its regulations
to permit identified persons to possess clothing corresponding to their gender
identities instead of clothing corresponding with their sex assigned at birth.152
CDCR also established the “Transgender Inmates Authorized Personal Property
Schedule,” which expanded the personal property, including hygiene items, that
transgender individuals could possess.153 Finally, pursuant to the settlement
agreement, only CDCR medical or mental health staff were permitted to identify individuals as transgender or as suffering from gender dysphoria.154
The most recent case from the Ninth Circuit involving a transgender incarcerated person’s right to SRS commenced in the District of Idaho in December
2018.155 Adree Edmo entered the custody of the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC) in 2012, where, shortly thereafter, an IDOC psychiatrist diag-

147

See Norsworthy v. Beard, 802 F.3d 1090, 1091–93 (9th Cir. 2015) (dismissing CDCR’s
appeal because the action had been rendered moot by the fact that Norsworthy was released
from prison one day prior to oral argument). This is not the only case where a transgender
individual has suddenly been paroled after a correctional department was ordered to provide
treatment for gender dysphoria. See Beth Schwartzapfel, Were These Transgender Prisoners
Paroled—Or Just Kicked Out?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 8, 2015, 7:15 AM), https://w
ww.themarshallproject.org/2015/10/08/were-these-transgender-prisoners-paroled-or-just-kic
ked-out [perma.cc/H5DT-WKBN].
148
Quine v. Beard, No. 14-CV-02726, 2017 WL 1540758, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017).
149
Id. While the details of the settlement agreement are provided in a different case, where
CDCR’s compliance with the agreement was challenged (litigation that proceeded to the
Ninth Circuit), for the sake of remaining within the scope of this Note, I will only discuss the
relevant portions of the settlement agreement, and not the subsequent litigation.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Quine v. Kernan, 741 F. App’x 358, 360 (9th Cir. 2018); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
15 § 3030(c) (West, Westlaw through 8/21/20 Register 2020, No. 34).
153
Quine, 741 F. App’x at 360; see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 3190(d) (West, Westlaw
through 8/21/20 Register 2020, No. 34).
154
Quine, 741 F. App’x at 362.
155
Edmo v. Idado Dep’t of Corr., 358 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (D. Idaho 2018) (“Edmo I”).
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nosed her with gender dysphoria.156 Despite achieving the maximum physical
changes associated with the hormone therapy that IDOC provided, Edmo continued to experience “extreme gender dysphoria,” resulting in habitual cutting
to relieve emotional pain and two attempts at self-castration.157 IDOC refused
to provide Edmo with SRS, contending that SRS was not medically necessary
to adequately treat Edmo’s gender dysphoria.158
After first pausing to place its decision in the context of confronting “the
full breadth and meaning” of the “Rule of Law,”159 the court outlined the
WPATH Standards of Care and eligibility criteria for SRS.160 Citing the Standards of Care as the only “evidence-based standards . . . accepted
by . . . nationally or internationally recognized medical professional groups,”161
the court found that Edmo satisfied the necessary eligibility criteria to receive
SRS and thus satisfied the “serious medical need” prong of her claim.162
The district court gave “virtually no weight” to the opinions of IDOC’s experts (one of whom was the same expert chided by the Norsworthy court)163
and refuted the experts’ claim that Edmo would be unable to satisfy WPATH’s
criteria because she “[had] not presented as female outside of the prison setting.”164 Rather, the court found that the Standards of Care explicitly apply “in
their entirety,” irrespective of the patient being housed in “institutional environments such as prisons,” and that denial of SRS because of residence in a
prison is not a reasonable accommodation.165
Proceeding to the subjective prong of Edmo’s claim, the court held that
IDOC had misapplied the “recognized standards of care” for treating
transgender patients and had trained its staff “with materials that discourage referrals for [SRS] and represent the opinions of a single person who rejects the
WPATH Standards of Care.”166 The court further found that IDOC had ignored
Edmo’s medical needs by failing to provide her with SRS “despite her actual
harm and ongoing risk of future harm, including self-castration attempts, cutting, and suicidal ideation.”167 The court found that IDOC and its medical provider, Corizon, Inc., had implemented a virtual blanket policy of denying SRS

156

Id. at 1109. Edmo’s diagnosis was thereafter confirmed by an IDOC psychologist. Id.
Id. at 1109–10.
158
Id. at 1118–19.
159
Id. at 1109.
160
Id. at 1111–13.
161
Id. at 1125.
162
Id. at 1124–27.
163
Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also supra note
145.
164
Edmo I, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1125–26.
165
Id. at 1125; see also WPATH, supra note 8, at 67–68.
166
Edmo I, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1126.
167
Id. at 1126–27.
157
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to transgender persons for “reasons unrelated to her medical need.”168 As such,
the district court determined that Edmo was likely to prove that IDOC had
treated her with deliberate indifference.169 The court ordered IDOC to provide
Edmo with adequate medical care, including providing her with SRS within six
months of the decision.170
In August 2019, the Ninth Circuit became the first circuit court to rule in
favor of an incarcerated person requesting SRS.171 Noting the judiciary’s responsibility to remedy violations of the Eighth Amendment, the court reviewed
Adree Edmo’s situation giving deference to the district court’s factual findings.172 The court noted that IDOC did not dispute that SRS may be medically
necessary in certain situations, and that the parties’ dispute was based on
whether SRS was medically necessary for Edmo.173 The Ninth Circuit held that
the district court’s factual findings were “amply supported” by the evidence
and testimony produced during “four months of intensive discovery and a
three-day evidentiary hearing.”174 Framing the appeal as a disagreement over
the implications of the district court’s factual findings, the court proceeded to
analyze Edmo’s deliberate medical indifference claim using the Farmer
framework.175
IDOC did not dispute that Edmo’s gender dysphoria triggered its Eighth
Amendment obligations.176 Additionally, multiple courts had previously held
that gender dysphoria constitutes a “serious medical need” under the Eighth
Amendment.177 These courts included the Ninth Circuit (previously),178 the
First Circuit,179 the Eighth Circuit,180 and the Seventh Circuit.181 Edmo still had
the burden of showing that the treatment plan that IDOC used in her case was
“medically unacceptable under the circumstances.”182 Consequently, “[t]he

168

Id. at 1127 (citing Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1192). The Norsworthy court had also
found that CDCR effectuated a blanket policy barring transgender individuals from receiving
SRS because CDCR’s guidelines for treatment of transgender individuals “did not [include]
SRS as a treatment option,” and because CDCR provided a training to its staff, “indicat[ing]
that SRS should never be provided to incarcerated [individuals].” See Norsworthy, 87 F.
Supp. 3d at 1191.
169
Edmo I, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1127.
170
Id. at 1129.
171
Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Edmo II”).
172
Id. at 766–67.
173
Id. at 767.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 767–68.
176
Id. at 785.
177
Id.
178
Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2015).
179
Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d 63, 86 (1st Cir. 2014).
180
White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988).
181
Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987).
182
Edmo II, 935 F.3d at 786.
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crux” of IDOC’s appeal was that it had provided Edmo with adequate and medically acceptable care.183
Quoting the Fifth Circuit’s Gibson opinion to acknowledge that a difference of opinion between an incarcerated individual and a physician is insufficient to prove deliberate medical indifference,184 the Ninth Circuit explained
that this is only the case where both “opinions are medically acceptable under
the circumstances.”185 Considering the circumstances of Edmo’s case, the court
held that Edmo had established that the treatment plan that IDOC’s medical
staff provided was not medically acceptable.186 This conclusion was based on
the district court’s findings, which the Ninth Circuit held were not made in
clear error.187 Rather, the district court had permissibly credited the testimony
of Edmo’s medical experts, who “logically and persuasively” applied the
WPATH Standards of Care.188 The district court had also permissibly discredited the testimony of IDOC’s medical experts, who “lacked expertise” and misapplied (or did not attempt to apply) the WPATH Standards of Care.189
Turning to deliberate indifference, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with
IDOC’s contention that its staff had not acted with “conscious disregard of an
excessive risk” to Edmo’s health.190 Dr. Scott Eliason, the Corizon psychiatrist
responsible for Edmo’s treatment, had continued with Edmo’s ineffective
treatment plan after Edmo’s first self-castration attempt, despite acknowledging
that the incident indicated that her gender dysphoria “had risen to another level.”191 Dr. Eliason had again refused to reevaluate Edmo’s treatment plan after
her second self-castration attempt.192
IDOC raised two arguments against a finding of deliberate medical indifference. First, no defendant, including Dr. Eliason, intended to inflict pain upon
Edmo; and second, because IDOC had provided Edmo with some care, no defendant could have acted with deliberate indifference.193 The court rejected both
of these arguments.194 Under Ninth Circuit precedent, prevailing on an Eighth
Amendment claim does not require a showing of malice or intent to harm the

183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194

Id.
Id.; see also Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2019).
Edmo II, 935 F.3d at 786.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 787–92.
Id.
Id. at 792–93.
Id. at 793.
Id.
Id.
Id.

21 NEV. L.J. 405

426

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:1

plaintiff;195 and “even extensive treatment over a period of years” does not immunize prison administrators from Eighth Amendment claims.196
The Ninth Circuit, unlike the Fifth Circuit, limited its decision to the facts
of Edmo’s case.197 The court refused to speculate as to whether a future plaintiff might be able to meet the threshold necessary to prove an Eighth Amendment violation.198 The forty-six-page Edmo II opinion concludes by remarking
that the Ninth Circuit is not the first court, “nor will [it] be the last,” to weigh in
on “an area of increased social awareness: transgender health care.”199 The
court noted that Eighth Amendment inquiries take into account developing understanding of issues in light of the medical community’s ongoing information,
research, and experience.200 The Ninth Circuit held that prison officials violate
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment where
they deny a person SRS with full awareness of the medical necessity of SRS as
treatment for gender dysphoria.201
IV. GIBSON V. COLLIER: A (CRUEL AND) UNUSUAL DECISION
Despite reaching opposite results for the respective plaintiffs, the First and
Ninth Circuits came to the same conclusion regarding whether a prison may be
required to provide SRS for a transgender individual: the decision must be
made on a case-by-case basis after an individualized inquiry has been completed.202 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that a prison policy banning SRS for incarcerated persons altogether does not violate the Eighth Amendment.203 This
decision largely flies in the face of established case law related to deliberate
medical indifference,204 raising questions concerning how these claims might
be decided in the Fifth Circuit moving forward.
In hopes of providing some context for the Gibson court’s deviation from
established precedent, it is worth briefly speculating about the underlying issues that might have factored into the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion. One could obviously posit, as Gibson’s attorney did, that this conclusion was an example of
195

Id.; see also Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir.
2013).
196
Edmo II, 935 F.3d at 793.
197
Id. at 767.
198
Id. at 803.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d 63, 90–91 (noting that a blanket ban on SRS would “conflict with
the requirement that medical care be individualized based on a particular prisoner’s serious
medical needs” (citation omitted)); Edmo II, 935 F.3d at 796 (emphasizing “Eighth Amendment precedent requiring a case-by-case determination of the medical necessity of a particular treatment”).
203
Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 2019) (“A state does not inflict cruel and
unusual punishment by declining to provide [SRS] to a transgender inmate.”).
204
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
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“the very worst sort of result-driven judicial activism.”205 Afterall, Judge Ho
was appointed by President Donald Trump, whose administration rolled back
policies favoring transgender individuals implemented by his predecessor.206
Judge Ho insisted on misgendering Gibson throughout the opinion.207 And his
conclusion was based, arguably, on an exaggeration of the medical debate surrounding SRS at a time of backlash against the transgender rights movement.208
However, beyond mere bias, a number of factors may influence any health care
claim made by an incarcerated individual.
Estimates show that 11 percent of annual prison spending nationally goes
toward healthcare, with some states spending over 20 percent of annual budgets
on healthcare for incarcerated persons.209 This spending comes out to over
twelve billion dollars of public funding per year.210 So, a court might be wary
of approving extra spending for healthcare which might not be medically necessary for an incarcerated person. And, as exposed by Kosilek’s case, this inclination likely increases when controversial figures or procedures are involved.211 Another explanation for the court’s decision might be the tendency to

205

David Artavia, Supreme Court Rejects Inmate’s Case for Gender Confirmation Surgery,
ADVOCATE (Dec. 10, 2019, 4:10 PM), https://www.advocate.com/transgender/2019/12/10/su
preme-court-rejects-inmates-case-gender-confirmation-surgery [perma.cc/3VDN-XFKJ].
206
Id.; see Lola Fadulu, Trump’s Rollback of Transgender Rights Extends Through Entire
Government, N.Y TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/us/politics/t
rump-transgender-rights.html [perma.cc/E2UJ-KD47] (summarizing the steps President
Trump has taken to roll back policies favoring transgender individuals).
207
Harvard Law Review, Recent Case: Gibson v. Collier, HARV. L. REV.: BLOG (Apr. 12,
2019), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/recent-case-_gibson-v-collier [perma.cc/3VMF-F3
PW].
208
Id; see also Katelyn Burns, The Internet Made Trans People Visible. It Also Left Them
More Vulnerable., VOX (Dec. 27, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/12/
27/21028342/trans-visibility-backlash-internet-2010 [perma.cc/HK3P-T55L] (chronicling
the transgender rights movement and the backlash against it).
209
CHRIS MAI & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF JUST., THE PRICE OF PRISONS:
EXAMINING STATE SPENDING TRENDS, 2010–2015, at 9 (2017), https://www.vera.org/downlo
ads/publications/the-price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends.pdf [perma.cc/GC6Q-DNS
W].
210
Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money of Mass Incarceration, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/money.html [perma.
cc/V4NG-8CXC].
211
See supra note 93. Policy related to transgender persons behind bars does not appear to
have become any less polarizing or political in the years since the Boston Globe’s editorials.
See e.g., Justine Coleman, Conservatives Slam Warren’s Call to Put Transgender Women in
Women’s Prisons, HILL (Jan. 13, 2020, 5:12 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4
78054-conservatives-slam-warrens-call-to-put-trans-women-in-female-prisons [perma.cc/6V
GB-5M7R] (summarizing the conservative response to Sen. Elizabeth Warren calling for
male-to-female transgender individuals to be housed in women’s prisons); Ryan Saavedra,
Warren: Inmates Are ‘Entitled’ To Taxpayer-Funded Transgender Surgery, DAILY WIRE
(Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.dailywire.com/news/warren-inmates-are-entitled-to-taxpayer-fu
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be suspicious, generally, that individuals might fake a disability to abuse disability laws and obtain a selfish advantage.212 This might be particularly concerning where there is the possibility of a predator faking gender dysphoria to
gain access to more victims.213
Additionally, the Gibson decision, as it relates to legal precedent, was perhaps less unusual when considering only Fifth Circuit case law and disregarding its sister circuits. While the Fifth Circuit has indeed generally used
Farmer’s two-prong deliberate medical indifference test in the past,214 the court
had never previously addressed a blanket ban on a medical treatment for incarcerated persons. And while the court had never treated the phrase “cruel and
unusual punishment” as a conjunctive test, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in
Harmelin v. Michigan could provide Supreme Court precedent for this position.215 So, Gibson, while unusual, might not have been such a radical break
from precedent.
Regardless of whether there were underlying reasons for coming to its decision or not, and whatever those reasons might have been, the Gibson decision
raises questions for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the Fifth Circuit moving forward. Do other procedures exist that might be subject to a blanket ban
for incarcerated persons in the future? Has the Fifth Circuit chosen to abandon
the Farmer framework for analyzing deliberate medical indifference altogether? Must a plaintiff now prove that her lack of treatment was both cruel and
unusual? An affirmative answer to any of these questions is likely untenable
under the weight of history and legal precedent.

nded-transgender-surgery [perma.cc/F86K-BGYQ] (characterizing an event where presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren expressed support for SRS for incarcerated individuals with
gender dysphoria who need it as “far-left” and calling Warren a “sexist”).
212
Doron Dorfman, Fear of the Disability Con: Perceptions of Fraud and Special Rights
Discourse, 53 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1051, 1066 (2019) (“public suspicion of abuse of disability laws and rights is indeed identifiable in public opinion”).
213
See, e.g., Kearns, supra note 51.
214
See, e.g., Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345–46 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Finding a violation
of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment also requires a
twofold analysis. [The plaintiff] must first prove objective exposure to a substantial risk of
serious harm. Additionally, he must show that prison officials acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to that risk.”); Lawson v. Dallas Cnty., 286 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir.
2002) (“The plaintiff must prove objectively that he was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm. . . . Additionally, the plaintiff must show that jail officials acted or failed to act
with deliberate indifference to that risk. . . . The deliberate indifference standard is a subjective inquiry; the plaintiff must establish that the jail officials were actually aware of the risk,
yet consciously disregarded it.” (internal citations omitted)).
215
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) (plurality opinion) (“According to its
terms, then, by forbidding ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ . . . the Clause disables the Legislature from authorizing particular forms or ‘modes’ of punishment—specifically, cruel
methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed.” (internal citations
and emphasis omitted)).
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A. A Blanket Ban in Lieu of an Individualized Inquiry
Circuit courts of appeals have widely held that a prison violates the Eighth
Amendment if it fails to conduct an individualized assessment of a person’s
medical condition prior to prescribing a treatment plan. Courts are particularly
wary where a prison has imposed a blanket ban on medical procedures. The
Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have addressed blanket bans on elective
abortions,216 treatment for hepatitis C,217 and surgeries for cataracts.218 In each
case, the court held the blanket ban to violate the Eighth Amendment.
In Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, the
Third Circuit heard a challenge to a jail policy requiring pregnant women to obtain court-ordered releases and their own financing to have an abortion absent a
medical emergency.219 Two individuals in the county’s custody sued for injunctive relief after having been denied access to and funding for abortions.220 After
losing in the district court, the county argued on appeal that it bore no financial
responsibility for provision of non-medically necessary treatments, likening
elective abortions to facelifts.221 The Third Circuit disagreed, instead holding
pregnancy to be a serious medical need.222 The court held that the jail’s blanket
ban on elective abortions “deni[ed] to a class of inmates the type of individualized treatment normally associated with . . . adequate medical care” in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.223
The Seventh Circuit reviewed a similar blanket ban in Roe v. Elyea.224 The
Illinois Department of Corrections had implemented a policy where it would
not begin treating an incarcerated person for hepatitis C if the person had less
than eighteen months left to serve.225 Prison officials said the policy was necessary to give the prison’s health care vendor time for six months of pretreatment, followed by a year-long treatment plan.226 The court held that categorically denying treatment for hepatitis C based on the expected length of an
person’s incarceration instead of considering each individual person’s condition
was “precisely the kind of conduct that constitutes a ‘substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment’ ” and thus deliberate medical indifference.227

216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987).
Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2011).
Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014).
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 328–29.
Id.
Id. at 344–45.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 850 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 862–63 (citation omitted).
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Most recently, the Ninth Circuit heard a challenge to the Nevada Department of Corrections’ “one eye policy” in Colwell v. Bannister.228 While the policy provided for a case-by-case analysis of whether an individual with cataracts
was able to “perform the required tasks of daily living in [prison],” prison medical staff would deny cataract removal surgery where the individual had “one
good eye.”229 The sixty-seven-year-old who challenged the policy had been
blind in one eye due to cataracts for twelve years by the time the Ninth Circuit
heard his appeal.230 The court held that blindness in one eye, unlike “a bump or
scrape or tummy ache,” was a serious medical need for the purposes of the
Farmer deliberate medical indifference analysis.231 It further held that the blanket denial “of a medically indicated surgery solely on the basis of an administrative policy” was “the paradigm” of deliberate medical indifference.232
Circuit courts have similarly required case-by-case analyses where
transgender persons with gender dysphoria request SRS. Four years prior to
Gibson, in Rosati v. Igbinoso, the Ninth Circuit heard allegations presented by
Mia Rosati, an individual incarcerated in California, that prison officials had
enacted a blanket policy against SRS.233 Prison officials had denied Rosati SRS
despite her multiple attempts at self-castration under hormonal treatment.234
The court held that Rosati’s allegations constituted a cognizable Eighth
Amendment claim.235 And in Fields v. Smith, the Seventh Circuit struck down,
under the Eighth Amendment, a Wisconsin law that prohibited the use of state
or federal funding for hormonal therapy or SRS for transgender persons behind
bars.236 Finally, in De’lonta v. Johnson, the Fourth Circuit held that a
transgender individual serving a seventy-three-year sentence for bank robbery
had “sufficiently alleged” the Virginia Department of Corrections’ deliberate
indifference in denying her SRS.237
In Edmo II, the Ninth Circuit noted that its holding “cleave[d] to settled
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence” requiring a fact-specific analysis of individual circumstances.238 The court cited the Kosilek IV decision as sister-circuit
precedent for a fact-specific analysis.239 The First Circuit based its decision on
the facts of Kosilek’s case, including conflicting expert testimony regarding the
228

Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1064–65.
230
Id. at 1063.
231
Id. at 1066.
232
Id. at 1063.
233
Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2015).
234
Id. at 1040.
235
Id. at 1039–40.
236
Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 552–53, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2011).
237
De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522, 525 (4th Cir. 2013). After the court ordered the
Virginia Department of Corrections to evaluate De’lonta for SRS, she was paroled within
months. See Schwartzapfel, supra note 147.
238
Edmo II, 935 F.3d 757, 794.
239
Id.
229
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medical necessity of SRS; a treatment plan for Kosilek, which was successful
despite not including SRS; and credible security concerns presented by
MDOC.240 The Ninth Circuit determined that the “factual differences” between
Kosilek’s case and Edmo’s necessitated the different outcomes.241 IDOC had
“not so much as allude[d]” to any security concerns, and the district court had
found that there was no reasonable disagreement as to the necessity of SRS for
Edmo.242 Despite resulting in opposite outcomes for the respective plaintiffs,
the Ninth Circuit explained, the two cases nevertheless mirrored one another
because each court had based its decision on individualized assessments.243
Ironically, the Fifth Circuit also cited Kosilek IV, but used it as precedent
for a circuit court “allow[ing] a blanket ban on [SRS].”244 The Fifth Circuit did
this despite the Kosilek IV court expressly warning that its decision should not
be interpreted as creating a de facto ban on SRS, as “any such policy would
conflict with the requirement that medical care be individualized based on a
particular prisoner’s serious medical needs.”245 In the face of decades of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence requiring individualized analyses for medical claims
made by incarcerated persons—including for SRS—the Fifth Circuit held exactly the opposite.
B. “Universal Acceptance by the Medical Community”
The Gibson court decided not to diverge from other courts in holding that
gender dysphoria constitutes a serious medical need—perhaps because the
TDCJ did not dispute that fact.246 As to whether TDCJ officials acted with deliberate indifference, however, the court found no genuine dispute of material
fact.247 The court made this determination because Gibson had failed to prove
“universal acceptance by the medical community” that SRS can be required to
treat gender dysphoria.248 A citation to any case law referencing this “universal
acceptance” standard is conspicuously missing from the opinion. Rather, the
court appears to have taken this standard from Gibson’s own brief.249 The dissent hypothesized that Gibson’s brief simply quoted the universal acceptance
standard as used by the district court.250 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit used this
240

Id.
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).
245
Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d 63, 90–91.
246
Gibson, 920 F.3d at 219.
247
Id. at 220.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id. at 235 (Barksdale, J., dissenting). The dissent also notes that the district court provided no case law to support this standard, and that Judge Barksdale was unable to locate any
case law to support it. Id.
241
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universal acceptance standard instead of the “knowledge and disregard of substantial risk” standard outlined by the Supreme Court in Farmer.251 Instead of
reviewing whether the TDCJ knew of the risks associated with Gibson’s gender
dysphoria and disregarded those risks by denying her SRS, the Gibson court
simply held that Gibson’s claim was “doom[ed]” by her failure to prove universal medical consensus regarding SRS.252
Even applying the universal medical acceptance standard, the Fifth Circuit
overstated the degree to which the medical community disagrees regarding the
use of SRS to treat gender dysphoria in some cases. As evidence of the medical
community’s ongoing debate, the Gibson court relied on the expert testimony
presented in Kosilek IV four years prior, noting simply that it “might have been
better practice” if TDCJ had provided its own evidence.253 The Gibson court
conceded that a single dissenting expert would not be enough to defeat universal medical consensus; rather, proof of a “robust and substantial good faith disagreement dividing respected members of the expert medical community”
would be needed.254 While that may describe the disagreement over the need
for SRS in Kosilek’s case (four years prior), it does not appear to represent the
discourse regarding SRS in the medical community as a whole.
As evidence of precisely how much the conversation regarding SRS has
changed over that time, the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim of ongoing medical
debate, citing to a laundry list of organizations and academics that have formed
a consensus as to the medical necessity of SRS in certain circumstances.255 The
list included organizations that have endorsed the WPATH Standards of Care,
including the American Medical Association (“AMA”) and the American Psychiatric Association.256 The AMA specifically supports the right of transgender
persons behind bars to have access to SRS and filed an amicus brief, joined by
other medical associations, in support of Edmo.257 Additionally, federal district
courts have applied the WPATH Standards of Care to cases in a variety of contexts, including the denial of a passport,258 the denial of medical treatments under insurance,259 and a “bathroom ban.”260
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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Gibson, 920 F.3d at 221.
253
Id. at 224.
254
Id. at 220.
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Edmo II, 935 F.3d 757, 795.
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Id.
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Staff News Writer, Transgender Prisoners Have Fundamental Right to Appropriate
Care, AMA (May 17, 2019), https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/population-care/tran
sgender-prisoners-have-fundamental-right-appropriate-care [perma.cc/H684-HPJF].
258
Zzyym v. Pompeo, 341 F. Supp. 3d 1248, 1258 (D. Colo. 2018) (“The Department defers
to the medical ‘standards and recommendations for the [WPATH], recognized as the authority in this field by the American Medical Association’ . . . .”).
259
Boyden v. Conlin, 341 F. Supp. 3d 979, 987 (W.D. Wis. 2018) (“Plaintiffs also point to
the WPATH Standards of Care (“SOC”) for treatment of gender dysphoria, which are widely
252
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When the Fifth Circuit may require a plaintiff to meet Gibson’s “universal
acceptance” standard is unclear. In the deliberate medical indifference cases
since Gibson, the court has not cited this standard but has rather continued to
use the Farmer framework to analyze the individuals’ claims.261 Perhaps, Gibson’s universal acceptance standard is only required where the treatment the
plaintiff seeks is new or emerging. 262 While such a precedent may delay better
treatments for incarcerated individuals within the Circuit for longer, the decision can be justified by a desire to not expose the individuals to unproven
treatments. Or, the court might only use differing standards when the plaintiff
recognized guidelines for the management of transgender individuals with gender dysphoria . . . .”).
260
Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 276 F. Supp. 3d 324, 367 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“The
WPATH Standards of Care are widely used and accepted in the field by clinicians dealing
with youth with gender identity issues.”). Legislators in numerous jurisdictions have attempted to pass some form of a bathroom bill—legislation aimed at restricting access to
bathrooms or locker rooms based on sex assigned at birth. See Joellen Kralik, “Bathroom
Bill” Legislative Tracking, NCSL (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/education/bathroom-bill-legislative-tracking635951130.aspx [https://perma.cc/RSY5-EVL8]. North
Carolina remains the only state to have successfully passed a bathroom bill (now repealed).
Id.
261
Petzold v. Rostollan, 946 F.3d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 2019) (“The prisoner ‘must first prove
objective exposure to a substantial risk of serious harm’—in other words, the prisoner must
prove a serious medical need. Second, the prisoner must prove the officials’ subjective
knowledge of this substantial risk. Third, the prisoner must prove that the officials, despite
their actual knowledge of the substantial risk, denied or delayed the prisoner’s medical
treatment.” (footnotes omitted)); Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211, 217 (5th Cir. 2019)
(“First, [the plaintiff] must show that the relevant official denied him ‘the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities’ and exposed him ‘to a substantial risk of serious
harm.’ . . . Second, the prisoner must show ‘that the official possessed a subjectively culpable state of mind in that he exhibited deliberate indifference’ to the risk of harm.” (internal
citations omitted)); Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019) (“To establish a
constitutional violation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant: (1) was ‘aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists’; (2)
subjectively ‘dr[e]w the inference’ that the risk existed; and (3) disregarded the risk.” (citation omitted)); Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 309 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[The plaintiff]
can show deliberate indifference by demonstrating that an official ‘refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct
that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’ ” (citation omitted)); Arenas v. Calhoun, 922 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 2019) (“To prevail on an Eighth
Amendment claim, an inmate must establish two elements. First, he must demonstrate that
the alleged deprivation was objectively serious, exposing him ‘to a substantial risk of serious
harm’ and resulting ‘in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’
Second, an inmate must prove that the official possessed ‘a subjectively culpable state of
mind’ in that he exhibited ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’ ” (footnotes
omitted)).
262
This still would not explain the Gibson court’s use of the standard. SRS can hardly be
labelled new or emerging, considering its existence in America dating back to 1952. See
Farah Naz Khan, A History of Transgender Health Care, SCI. AM.: GUEST BLOG (Nov. 16,
2016), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/a-history-of-transgender-health-care/
[perma.cc/4ZCZ-3XGZ] (“The first American to undergo a sex change operation was Christine Jorgensen, who brought significant attention to the transgender revolution in America
when her story hit New York Times headlines in 1952.”).
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provides it with one, as Gibson did in acknowledging the need for “universal
acceptance by the medical community” in her brief. It is doubtful that litigants
provide courts with new legal standards very often. Although that very fact, if
true, might be a way for both litigants and the court to distinguish Gibson away
in the future.
C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
“Lest we lose the forest for the trees,” the Gibson court declared, “a prison
violates the Eighth Amendment only if it inflicts punishment that is both ‘cruel
and unusual.’ ”263 Thus, the court continued, a prison policy that is “widely
practiced . . . across the country” cannot, “under the plain meaning of the
word,” be “unusual.”264 Because only one state had ever provided SRS for an
incarcerated person, Gibson could not state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment.265 As precedent for this holding, the Fifth Circuit cited to a book on
the interpretation of legal texts by Justice Antonin Scalia,266 a Yale Law Journal
article, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinions in Harmelin v. Michigan and Stanford
v. Kentucky, and Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent in Glossip v. Gross.267 The
court largely ignored, however, decades of case law where “cruel and unusual”
is used as a term-of-art, rather than a conjunctive test, and decades more of case
law analyzing deliberate medical indifference claims under the Farmer framework.268
As noted above, this idea has been the subject of much discussion.269 The
Trop court questioned whether “the word ‘unusual’ ha[d] any qualitative meaning different from ‘cruel’ ” when the two words are used together as a phrase.270
Scholars are split on that issue. Some argue that the phrase should be interpreted as a two-part conjunctive test, 271 while others suggest the phrase is simply
an example of hendiadys.272 The degree of the framers’ intent has even been
called into question, with one scholar suggesting that the phrase might have
been little more than “constitutional ‘boilerplate.’ ”273 Justice Scalia was obvi263

Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 226 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII).
Id.
265
Id. at 227–28.
266
Id. at 226. Justice Scalia was not discussing the merits of this argument, rather providing
an example of the way one ought to interpret a conjunctive list. See ANTONIN SCALIA &
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING THE LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 116 (2012).
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Gibson, 920 F.3d at 226–27.
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See supra Part II.
269
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958).
271
See Ryan, supra note 53, at 573–80.
272
Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary AND Proper” and “Cruel AND Unusual”: Hendiadys in
the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 706–20 (2016). “Hendiadys” refers to a phrase in
which “two terms separated by a conjunction work together as a single complex expression.”
Id. at 688.
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Granucci, supra note 53, at 839–40.
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ously a proponent of the “plain meaning” analysis that the Gibson court adopted.274 And Justice Breyer adopted a similar line of reasoning in his recent dissent to Glossip v. Gross.275
Regardless of this debate, the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has had little to do with the Constitution’s text and more to do with its
interpretation of the clause’s intent.276 Or, as the Ninth Circuit aptly noted in
Edmo II, this originalist argument does not control the plaintiffs’ claims—
Estelle v. Gamble does.277 The Gibson court concluding that Gibson’s claim
failed “as a matter of established precedent” and then proceeding with its plain
meaning analysis after the fact is telling.278 Indeed “as a matter of established
precedent,” and as discussed above, Estelle, and then Farmer, established the
framework for analyzing deliberate medical indifference.279 Circuit courts have
applied Farmer’s “knowledge and disregard of substantial risk” test in reviewing a variety of medical indifference claims brought by incarcerated persons.280
If the plain meaning analysis the Gibson court used had been supported by case
law and history, deliberate medical indifference jurisprudence would likely not
have evolved in the way that it has. Unfortunately for Gibson, the Fifth Circuit
circumvented Estelle and Farmer in using its “universal medical acceptance”
test and its plain meaning analysis. Had the court been willing to apply Supreme Court precedent, as it has in other deliberate indifference cases,281 perhaps Gibson would have been granted relief.
The need to analyze whether a “punishment” is both cruel and unusual
rarely arrives. This is the first case in which the Fifth Circuit decided to establish that analysis, and how often the question will resurface is unclear. For
claims of deliberate medical indifference, there will likely be some sort of trend
for prisons to either provide or to deny a specific medical treatment. Gibson
274

See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) (plurality opinion) (“by forbidding ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ the Clause disables the Legislature from authorizing . . . cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed.” (internal citations omitted)); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989), abrogated by Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Justice Scalia authored both opinions.
275
Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 938–39 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Eighth
Amendment forbids punishments that are cruel and unusual. Last year, in 2014, only seven
States carried out an execution. Perhaps more importantly, in the last two decades, the imposition and implementation of the death penalty have increasingly become unusual.”).
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Bray, supra note 272, at 708 (“It is true that the U.S. Supreme Court has not structured its
recent decisions on the Clause in terms of two requirements. But those decisions have only a
tenuous connection to the constitutional text; they rest primarily on other modalities of constitutional interpretation.” (footnotes omitted)); see also David A. Strauss, The Modernizing
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adoption of the modernization approach has occurred in cases interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”).
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certainly calls into question new medical procedures. As discussed above, a
new or emerging medical procedure will be per se unusual until a certain percentage of prisons provide it for incarcerated persons.282 In these cases, perhaps
the Fifth Circuit is not concerned with depriving, however briefly, the incarcerated persons housed in its jurisdiction with the latest medical treatments. More
likely, perhaps, the court will simply leave out this plain meaning analysis from
its deliberate medical indifference cases moving forward, as it has in the past.
CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit’s Gibson v. Collier decision was indeed unusual. And the
decision was also cruel, in the fact that it denied a person suffering from gender
dysphoria the treatment that may have provided her with relief from her pain.
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit largely ignored established precedent
relating to deliberate medical indifference. The court eschewed sister circuit
decisions directly on point with Gibson’s claim in favor of an approach that has
already been ignored in subsequent Fifth Circuit cases and that will likely be
found to be unworkable moving forward.
The Supreme Court denied Gibson’s petition for writ of certiorari.283 Her
opportunity for relief has likely passed. And the Gibson decision may foreclose
the claims of other individuals seeking relief in a variety of contexts moving
forward. The Fifth Circuit has now established precedent for permitting prisons
to impose blanket bans on medical procedures, for ignoring the Farmer framework for analyzing deliberate medical indifference claims, and for finding punishments to be constitutional no matter how cruel—provided they are not also
unusual. To the extent the Fifth Circuit is willing to distinguish away Gibson,
this unusual decision’s harm may be limited to Gibson’s own case. For incarcerated persons—particularly those who suffer with gender dysphoria—within
its jurisdiction, however, there are now fewer reasons to hope that the Fifth
Circuit will serve justice when prisons fail to provide adequate medical treatment.
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See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
Gibson v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 653 (2019) (mem).

